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Religious Orientation, Guilt,
Confession, and Forgiveness
KATHERYN RHOADS MEEK and JEANNE S. ALBRIGHT
Loyola University o f Chicago

MARK R. McMINN
Wheaton College
Religious orientation and psychological functioning were investigated in an analog
study with 83 participants. After completing
the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport &
Ross, 1967), participants read a continuous
narrative with three scenarios in which they
first committed a dishonest act, and then felt
compelled to confess what they had done.
The final scenario contained a manipulation
of grace or no-grace, in which half of the
participants were forgiven for their act and
half were not. Following each scenario, participants were tested for feelings of guilt and
related behavioral and emotional responses. Intrinsically religious participants were
more prone to guilt, more likely to confess
their wrongdoing, and more likely to forgive themselves than extrinsically religious
subjects. Guilt was found to have a médiating effect between intrinsic religiousness and
some, but not all, outcome variables. The
potentially beneficial consequences of guilt
are discussed.

1970; Richards, Smith, & Davis, 1989).
The most consistent finding of “good religion”
has to do with Allport and Ross’s (1967) work on
religious orientation, in which they make a distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically religious
individuals. This differentiation has proven useful in
a number of studies. Several studies propose that
intrinsics enjoy a healthier religious experience than
extrinsics (Bergin, 1991; Bergin, Masters, & Richards,
1987; Donahue, 1985; Watson, Morris, Foster, &
Hood, 1986; Watson, Hood, & Morris, 1985; Watson,
Morris, & Hood, 1988) as they tend to “find their
master motive in religion” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.
434), as compared to extrinsics who appear to evaluate their religious beliefs in light of their other
needs—security, social contacts, self-justification, etc.
Though guilt has been theoretically linked to
psychological disturbance, the relationships among
religion, guilt, and disturbance have been debated
vigorously. Guilt has sometimes been perceived as a
maladaptive and self-defeating emotion accompanying religious faith (Ellis, I960), and sometimes as an
emotion that reflects empathy for others and leads
to useful reparative actions (Mowrer &
Veszelovszky, 1980; Tangney, 1991). This distinction
was highlighted in the 1980 debate among Allen
Bergin (1980a, 1980b), Albert Ellis (1980), and Gary
Walls (1980) in the Journal of Consulting and Clintcal Psychology. In his description of theistic values,
Bergin (1980a) included taking responsibility and
providing restitution for one’s actions, and accepting
“guilt, suffering, and contrition as keys to change”
(p. 100). Ellis (1980) responded that while one
should take responsibility for harmful and immoral
acts, feelings of guilt should be minimized. Ellis
defined guilt as “self-damnation in addition to
denouncing one’s acts” (p. 636). Elsewhere, Ellis has
described the guilt resulting from the concept of sin
as “the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neu-

n 1980 Bergin (1980b) suggested that some
aspects of religious beliefs may contribute to
mental health, and that psychologists need to
empirically evaluate these facets of religion
(Bergin, 1980a). Several studies suggest there is in
fact what can appropriately be termed “good religion” that does not distract from mental health, and
perhaps contributes to it (Allport & Ross, 1967;
Bergin, 1983, 1991; Bergin, Masters, & Richards,
1987; Bergin, Stinchfield, Gaskin, Masters, & Sullivan, 1988; Lindenthal, Myers, Pepper, & Stern,
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rotic disturbance” (Ellis, I960, p. 192).
An interesting finding reported by Richards
(1991) is that intrinsically religious participants score
higher on a guilt-proneness scale than extrinsic participants. However, despite being more prone to
guilt feelings, intrinsics do not report more depression or less existential well-being than other participants. Similarly, Tangney and her colleagues have
reported several studies suggesting that guilt-proneness, unlike shame-proneness, is unrelated to psychological maladjustment (Burggraf & Tangney,
1990; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney, 1991;
Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher,
1991; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).
Thus, guilt, for the intrinsically religious, is not
always a negative phenomenon. For example, when
Israel’s King David committed adultery and murder,
he felt deep remorse:
Wash away all my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin.
For I know my transgressions, and my sin is always before
me. Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is
evil in your sight, so that you are proved right when you
speak and justified when you judge. (Psalm 51: 2-4)

David’s sorrowful remorse led him to marvel at
God’s grace rather than fall into a state of excessive
self-deprecation. He later concluded: “Cleanse me
with hyssop, and I will be clean; wash me, and I
will be whiter than snow” (Psalm 51:7).
Christian authors have used these biblical exampies to note a positive role for remorse or certain
forms of guilt. Narramore (1984) distinguishes
betw een constructive sorrow, a remorseful
response leading to confession and reconciliation,
and guilt, a self-focused response that damages
one’s self-image. Richards (1991) exhorts counselors
to make a similar distinction in their work with religiously devout students:
Thus, although religiously devout students may be more
prone to guilt, counselors should not assume that this is
dysfunctional for them. In their desire to help clients feel
better, practitioners have at times indiscriminately attempted to neutralize clients’ guilt without giving sufficient considération to whether the guilt was an appropriate emotional response to actual wrongdoings, (p. 194)

Such divergent conclusions, coupled with
Bergin’s (1980a) suggestion that psychologists conduct empirical investigations on the effects of religious beliefs, warrant further investigation concerning the effects of religious orientation and guilt on
emotions and behaviors. The present study was
designed to explore the relationship between reli

gious orientation, experiences of guilt and forgiveness, and self-reported well-being. We hypothesized
that intrinsically religious participants will be more
likely than extrinsically religious participants to feel
guilt and to have more reparative responses to their
transgressions.

Method
Participants

Participants in the study were 64 women and 44
men recruited at Loyola University of Chicago. Of
the 108 participants, 53 were recruited from a campus chapter of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, and
55 from undergraduate psychology classes. The
InterVarsity students participated on a voluntary
basis and the undergraduate students received class
credit for their participation.
Manipulation

Participants were informed that the study was
designed to assess dating and work attitudes of college populations. After completing an informed consent form, participants were given a packet of questionnaires and hypothetical scenarios in the
following order: a measure of religious orientation, a
narrative description of a hypothetical scenario, a set
of Likert-scale items on which participants rated
their likely response to scenario, a second hypothetical scenario, a second set of Likert-scale items, a
third hypothetical scenario, and a third set of Likertscale items.
The three hypothetical scenarios developed for
this study comprise the experimental manipulation.
All participants received identical scripts for the first
two scenarios, except that gender references were
matched with the gender of the participants. The
first scenario was designed to induce feelings of
guilt by creating a situation in which the person
reads that he/she chose to lie to his/her boss by
calling in sick in order to go on a date with a person
he/she has been interested in for 2 months. The second scenario added information to the first, and was
designed to increase feelings of guilt by hypothetically placing the person at the scene of the date, a
party, in which he or she runs into a co-worker who
is close to the boss. This co-worker informs the person that he/she has been working extra hours in
order to have this day off and naturally assumes that
the person has done the same. The scenario ends
with the person hypothetically waking up the day
after and realizing that there is no alternative but to

192
.call the boss and confess the untruth
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
-two conditions for the third scenario. Half the partie
ipants were given a “grace” scenario in which they
,hypothetically call their boss to confess, apologize
offer various forms of compensation, and ask for
-forgiveness. In this “grace” scenario the boss is read
ily understanding and forgiving, demanding no
compensation except a promise to come to him or
her in the future first if a similar situation should
arise. The other half of the participants were given a
no-grace” scenario in which they call their boss and“
-offer the same confession as the first group. Howev
,er, in this scenario the boss is harsh, overtly angry
and unforgiving. The “no-grace” scenario ends with
the boss telling the worker that if he or she (the
)boss) weren’t so short staffed, he or she (the worker
.would definitely be fired
-After reading and completing the packet, par
-ticipants were debriefed and thanked for their par
.ticipation
Instruments

,The Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross
was used to measure intrinsic and extrinsic )1967
religiousness. Those scoring above the median on
the intrinsic scale and below the median on the
-extrinsic scale were classified as intrinsic. Those scor
ing above the median on the extrinsic scale and
-below the median on the intrinsic scale were classi
fied as Extrinsic. Some participants ) = מwere )27
dropped from the analysis because they either
scored above the median on both the intrinsic and
-extrinsic scales (what Allport and Ross called proreli
giousness) or because they scored below the median
on both scales (nonreligious), leaving 42 intrinsically
.religious and 41 extrinsically religious participants
-Likert-type scales were used after each hypothet
-ical scenario to assess whether intrinsics and extrin
-sics differ in perceptions of guilt, grace, and forgive
ness, and likelihood of committing and repeating
the wrongful act. Participants indicated their
,response to each statement on 10-point Likert scales
where 1 is “not at all likely” and 10 is “extremely
likely.” After the first scenario, they answered the
:following questions
How likely are you to feel guilty about .1
?calling in sick
?How likely are to to have called in sick .2
How likely are you to have talked to your .3
boss earlier and tried to get the day off?
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4. How likely are you to call back and tell
the truth?
5. How likely is it that you would do this
again in the future?
6. How likely are you to feel good about
getting the day off?
After reading the second scenario, participants
responded to a similar set of questions, rated on the
same Likert-scale format as the first set of questions:
1. How likely are you to feel guilty about
calling in sick?
2. How likely are you to call your boss and
confess the truth?
3. How likely are you to repeat this action in
the future?
4. How likely are you to feel good about
getting the day off?
After the final scenario, participants responded to
the following questions on a Likert scale where 1 is
“to a very small extent” and 10 is “to a very great
extent”:
1. To what extent do you feel better about
calling?
2. To what extent do you feel happy about
calling?
3. To what extent are you prone to repeating
this action?
4. To what extent do you feel good about
the date?
5. To what extent do you feel good about
getting an extra day off?
6. To what extent do you feel guilty?
7. To what extent do you feel forgiven?
8. To what extent do you forgive yourself?
9. To what extent do you feel that telling the
truth is enough for you to go back to
work with a clean conscience?
10. To what extent to you feel that God has
forgiven you?
Analysis

First, three 2x3 split-plot Analyses of Variance
were computed to investigate the effects of
religious orientation on self-reported emotions and
predicted behaviors. Religious orientation was the
between-subjects and level of information (scenario
1-scenario 2־־scenario 3) was the repeated-measures
factor. To control for the increased probability of
Type I error resulting from multiple hypothesis tests,
we selected a conservative alpha level of .01. Second, to assess likelihood of confession, another
( anovas )
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Table 1

Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations on Likert-Scale Items by
Religious Orientation Following Each o f the Three Scenarios
Scenarie 2

Scenario 1
Items

Scenario 3

I

E

I

E

I

E

9.41
1.08
42

7.66
2.60
41

9.81
0.55
42

8.66
1.65
41

7.38
3.07
42

6.83
2.68
41

2.07
1.76
42

3.59
2.39
41

1.55
1.33
42

2.73
1.88
41

1.64
1.53
42

2.83
2.31
41

2.81
2.93
42

4.37
3.05
41

1.95
2.01
42

3.17
2.48
41

2.02
1.99
42

3.63
2.67
41

6.19
3.03
42

3.02
2.25
41

7.52
2.56
42

5.32
2.56
41

Guilt

M
SD
n
Likelihood of committing
similar act in the future

M
SD
n
Feeling good about
getting day off

M
SD
n
Likelihood of confessing
action

M
SD
n

Note. “I” indicates intrinsic religious orientation, Έ ” indicates extrinsic orientation. Scores range from 1 to 10 with higher
scores reflecting higher degrees of guilt, likelihood of confessing and repeating wrongful act, and likelihood of feeling
good about the day off.

split-plot anova was computed with religious orientation as one factor and level of information (seenario 1-scenario 2) as the repeated-measures factor.
Third, to assess the effects of the scenarios, additional
2x2 Analyses of Variance ( anovas) were performed
with religious orientation (intrinsic-extrinsic) as one
factor and case outcome (grace-no grace) as the
other. Again, a conservative alpha level of .01 was
used to control for the inflated likelihood of Type I
error that comes with multiple hypothesis tests.
Fourth, we used correlations and multiple regression
to determine if guilt plays a mediating role in the
relationship between intrinsic religiousness and various outcome measures.

Results
Several interesting main effects emerged when
the 2 x3 split-plot anovas were used to evaluate selfreported emotions and predicted behavior for intrinsically- and extrinsically-religious participants. No
significant interaction effects were observed.

When self-reported guilt was used as the
dependent variable (see Table 1), we found that
intrinsics reported higher levels of guilt than extrinsics, F (1,81) = 13-3, p < •001. There was also a
main effect for level of information, F (2,80) = 29.2,
p < .001, as all participants increased their guilt ratings after the second scenario (talking to coworker), t (82) = 4.1, p < .001, and decreased their
guilt ratings after the third scenario (calling to confess act), t (81) = 6.5, p < .001.
When likelihood of committing a similar act in
the future was the dependent variable (see Table 1),
we found a significant main effect for religious orientation, F (1,81) = 17.0, p < .001, with intrinsics reporting less likelihood of repeating the behavior than
extrinsics (intrinsics also reported less likelihood of
calling in sick in the first place, t (80) = 3.4, p < .005.
There was also a main effect for level of information,
F (2,80) = 5.8, p < .005, as all participants reported
decreasing their likelihood of calling in sick in the
future after reading the second scenario.
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T able 2

Means and Standard Deviations fo r Final-Scenario Forgiveness Items in Which
Significant Differences Were Observed Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Participants
Items

Intrinsics

Extrinsics

Likelihood of
forgiving self**

M
SD
n

6.98
2.50
42

5.15
2.35
41

9.38
1.04
42

7.12
3.00
41

Likelihood of feeling
forgiven by God***

M
SD
n
** p < .01

*** p < .001

When using participants’ likely feelings about
getting the day off as a dependent variable (see
Table 1), we found a main effect for religious orientation, F (1,81) = 9.8, p < .005, with extrinsics reporting themselves likely to feel better about having the
day off than intrinsics. Again, there was also a main
effect for level of information, F (2,80) = 8.8, p <
.001, with participants reporting themselves likely to
feel worse about getting the day off after talking to
the co-worker (Scenario 2).
Thus, as participants received more information
they reported themselves likely to experience
greater feelings of guilt until they were told they
confessed their misdeed, at which point the guilt
decreased. Similarly, participants reported less likelihood of repeating the offense, and less probability
of feeling satisfaction with getting the day off after
reading the information in Scenario 2. Intrinsics
reported more likelihood of guilt, less likelihood of
repeating the offense, and less probable satisfaction
with getting the day off than extrinsics.
We were also interested in knowing if participants would report themselves as likely to confess
their action after the first and second scenarios (see
Table 1). This could not be assessed after the third
scenario because confessing was given as part of
the scenario. A 2x2 anova was computed for perceived likelihood of confession (as the dependent
variable) with religious orientation as one factor and
level of information (Scenario 1-Scenario 2) as the
repeated-measures factor. Intrinsics reported them

selves as more likely to confess to their boss after
the first and second scenarios than extrinsics, F
(1,81) = 26.7, p < .001. All participants, regardless of
religious orientation, reported themselves as more
likely to confess their wrong after the second seenario than after the first, F (1,81) = 55.0, p < .001. No
significant interactions were found.
In order to assess reported likelihood of confession, forgiveness, and the emotional consequences of
the scenarios, several additional 2x2 Analyses of
Variance ( anovas) were performed with religious orientation (intrinsic-extrinsic) as one factor and case
outcome (grace-no grace) as the other. Several differenees between intrinsics and extrinsics were noted.
Following the last scenario, intrinsics expressed a
greater likelihood of forgiving themselves, F (1,79) ־
11.7, p < .005, and were more inclined than extrinsics to report the likelihood of feeling forgiven by
God, F (1,79) = 23.1, p < .001 (see Table 2). No
main effects for case outcome and no significant
interactions between religious orientation and outcome of the scenario were found.
Differences were also observed on the reported
feelings after calling the boss in Scenario 3· Those in
the grace condition reported that they would likely
feel better that they had called than those in the nograce condition, F (1,79) = 79.0, p < .001. In addition, intrinsics reported feeling better about calling
than extrinsics, F (1,79) = 15.7, p < .001. Extrinsics
reported being more likely to feel good about the
date than intrinsics, F (1,79) = 36.8, p < .001. There
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T able 3

Correlations o f Selected Variables With Intrinsic Religiousness, Guilt, and Intrinsic Religiousness After Partialling Out Variance Associated With Guilt

D ependent Variable

Intrinsic
Religiousness

Intrinsic
Religiousness
after
partialling
out guilt

Guilt

-.4 4 5 * *

-.4 1 4 ”

-.4 1 5 * *

-.2 5 3 *

 •־4 7 5 **

-.0 5 0

*

- .3 5 3 * *

1
H¿־
00
c\

Feel good about
getting day off
Likelihood of
doing this again
in the future

1
k)
\l
\J\

TIME 1

ΉΜΕ 2

Feel good about
getting day off

*p< .05 **p < .01
was no interaction between religious orientation and
case outcome for feelings about the date.
Finally, we were interested in knowing if guilt
mediates the relationship between intrinsic religiousness and the self-reported dependent variables (likelihood of confessing, feelings of enjoying the date,
and so on). We used a method of identifying mediating variables adapted from that described by
Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we determined
which Likert-scale dependent variables were significantly correlated with intrinsic religiousness. Second,
we determined if there was a significant correlation
between self-reported guilt and intrinsic religiousness. If both these correlations were significant, we
entered guilt and intrinsic religiousness (in that
order) into a hierarchical multiple regression equation attempting to predict scores on the dependent
variable. If guilt had a significant correlation with the
dependent variable and intrinsic religiousness did
not (after partialling out the variance due to guilt),
then guilt was taken to have a mediating effect on
the outcome variable. Using this method, we found
guilt to have a significant mediating effect on
respondents’ feeling good about getting the day off
after scenarios 1 (Guilt: t = 3-3, p < •005; Intrinsicness: t = 1.7, n s ) and 2 (Guilt: t = 4.1, p < .001;
Intrinsicness: t = 0.5, n s ). There were no other
dependent variables for which guilt completely

mediated the effects of intrinsic religiousness. However, guilt partially mediated the relationship
between intrinsic religiousness and the likelihood of
repeating the offense, reported after scenario 1
(Guilt: t = 2.6, p < .05; Intrinsicness: t = 2.6, p <
.05—see Table 3).

Discussion
This study supports Richards’ (1991) somewhat
surprising report that intrinsically religious individuals are more prone to guilt than extrinsically religious individuals. A reflexive interpretation of
Richards’ findings and these data might be that
intrinsically religious people are more guilt-prone
and therefore more likely to disturb themselves with
self-condemning thoughts and beliefs (Ellis, I960,
1971, 1983, 1992a, 1992b). However, these results
suggest that guilt may play a partially instrumental
role for the intrinsically religious. This is consistent
with Tangney’s (1991) findings that guilt-proneness
is often related to empathy for others and reparative
actions. Tangney and others (e.g., Wicker, Payne, &
Morgan, 1983) have noted that guilt and shame are
distinct emotions despite their commonalities.
The present study provides evidence that guilt
among intrinsically religious individuals is not necessarily destructive. Intrinsically religious participants,
with their heightened guilt response, were more
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likely to forgive themselves and feel forgiven by
God, and reported feeling better about calling the
boss in Scenario 3. Despite their heightened guiltproneness, intrinsically religious individuals have
consistently been found to experience greater emotional health than their externally religious counterparts (Donahue, 1985; Richards, 1991).
One possible explanation is that stronger internal
beliefs in self-forgiveness and forgiveness from God
following confession help protect intrinsics from
internalizing negative feelings. Extrinsics are less
protected by beliefs of forgiveness and, therefore,
may be more likely to convert their guilt feelings to
emotions of depression, anxiety, hostility, and so on.
For the intrinsically religious, feeling forgiven is
more related to doing the right thing and less related to the response of others.
Intrinsic religiousness appears to inhibit certain
behaviors and emotions. Intrinsics reported themselves as less likely than extrinsics to have committed the dishonest act, less likely to repeat it in the
future, and less likely to have experienced enjoyment of the date and the day off. Responses on
most of these variables appear to be due to factors
other than, or in addition to, the guilt they reported
likely to experience. However, guilt played a mediating role in causing intrinsics to feel worse about
hypothetically getting the day off.
Guilt and religious orientation are also associated
with confession. Across all scenarios, intrinsics were
more likely than extrinsics to confess their misdeed.
This suggests that intrinsics’ confessions may be
more related to internal factors, and less influenced
by external events. For the intrinsically religious, it
may be that violating internal standards leads to a
desire for confession. The emotional and physical
benefits of confession (Pennebaker, Hughes, &
O’Heeron, 1987) then reinforce the process. It
should be noted that violating these internal standards also appears to lead to greater feelings of guilt
for the intrinsically religious. However, we see no
evidence here that increased guilt brings about an
increased likelihood of confession. Rather, guilt is
associated with other factors that lead to confession.
There are several limitations to this study. First, it
is an analog study where participants described
potential reactions to a hypothetical situation. It is
difficult to know if, in an identical “real life” situation, they would respond as they reported in this
study. Additional non-analog studies on this topic
are necessary. Second, the social desirability of
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responses was not measured in this study. It is possible that the intrinsically and extrinsically religious
responded in socially desirable directions based on
their understanding of the roles of guilt and confession. In future studies a measure of social desirability of response style should be included. Third, the
sampling method was not ideal. In order to get sufficient diversity in the sample, two groups were
used. Those participants from the campus chapter of
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship were perhaps distinct from the general psychology students in ways
other than religious orientation. Researchers who
are able to start with a larger research pool may
offer more precise findings and interpretations in
future studies. Fourth, the measurement of guilt was
dependent on self-reported responses to Likert-scale
items. Using an instrument with known reliability
and validity would enhance the generalizability of
the study. One instrument that shows initial promise
is the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (Tangney, 1990). Finally, it seems likely that guilt
is a multifaceted emotion that will require further
distinction in the future. Mosher (1966) suggested a
distinction between sex guilt, hostile guilt, and
morality-conscience guilt many years ago, but clarifying research has not followed his initial report.
The main contribution of this study is that it adds
to the growing evidence that some forms of religiousness and guilt are adaptive. Clinicians who discourage guilt in their clients might be wise to consider the
positive behaviors that are associated with guilt
(McMinn, 1984). Richards (1991) wisely concludes:
Before intervening, counselors need to carefully assess
whether guilt manifested by clients is realistic and potentially functional or irrational and dysfunctional, (p. 194)

REFERENCES
Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. Journal o f Personality and Social
Psychology, 5, 432-443·
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:
Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal
o f Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Bergin, A. E. (1980a). Psychotherapy and religious values.
Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48, 95-105.
Bergin, A. E. (1980b). Religious and humanistic values: A
reply to Ellis and Walls. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 48, 642-645.
Bergin, A. E. (1983). Religiosity and mental health: A critical
réévaluation and meta-analysis. Professional Psychology,
14, 170-184.

197

MEEK, ALBRIGHT a n d McM INN
Bergin, A. E. (1991). Values and religious issues in psychotherapy and mental health. American Psychologist, 46,
394-403.
Bergin, A. E., Masters, K. S., & Richards, P. S. (1987). Religiousness and mental health reconsidered: A study of an
intrinsically religious sample. Journal o f Counseling Psychology, 34, 197-204.
Bergin, A. E., Stinchfield, R. D., Gaskin, T. A., Masters, K.
S., & Sullivan, C. E. (1988). Religious lifestyle and mental
health: An exploratory study. Journal o f Counseling Psy־
chology, 35, 91-98.
Burggraf, S. A., & Tangney, J. P. (1990, June). Shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and attributional style related to children’s depression. Poster presented at the annual meeting
of the American Psychological Society, Dallas.
Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness:
Review and meta-analysis. Journal o f Personality a n d
Social Psychology, 48, 400-419.
Ellis, A. (I960). There is no place for the concept of sin in
psychotherapy. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 7, 188-192.
Ellis, A. (1971). The case against religion: A psychotherap ist’s view. New York: Institute for Rational Living.
Ellis, A. (1980). Psychotherapy and atheistic values: A
response to A. E. Bergin’s “Psychotherapy and religious
values.” Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48,
635-639.
Ellis, A. (1983). The case against religiosity. New York:
Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy.
Ellis, A. (1992a). My current views on rational-emotive therapy (r e t) and religiousness. Journal of Rational-Emotive &
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 10, 37-40.
Ellis, A. (1992b). Do I really hold that religiousness is irrational and equivalent to emotional disturbance? American
Psychologist, 47, 428-429.

Richards, P. S. (1991)· Religious devoutness in college students: Relations with emotional adjustment and psychological separation from parents. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 38, 189-196.
Richards, P. S., Smith, S. A., & Davis, L. F. (1989). Healthy
and unhealthy forms of religiousness manifested by psychotherapy clients: An empirical investigation. Journal of
Research in Personality, 23, 506-524.
Tangney, J. P. (1990). Assessing individual differences in
proneness to shame and guilt: Development of the selfconscious affect and attribution inventory. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 102-111.
Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and
the ugly. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 61,
598-607.
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P. E., Burggraf, S. A., Gramzow, R.,
& Fletcher, C. (1991, June). Children’s shame-proneness, but
not guilt-proneness, is related to emotional and behavioral
maladjustment. Poster presented at the annual meeting of
the American Psychological Society, Washington, DC.
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P. E., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, and psychopathology.
Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 103, 469-478.
Walls, G. B. (1980). Values and psychotherapy: A comment
on “Psychotherapy and religious values.” Journal of Consuiting and Clinical Psychology, 48, 640-641.
Watson, P. J., Hood, R. W., & Morris, R. J. (1985). Dimensions of religiosity and empathy. Journal of Psychology and
Christianity, 4, 73-85.
Watson, P. J., Morris, R. J., Foster, J. E., & Hood, R. W.
(1986). Religiosity and social desirability. Journal fo r the
Scientific Study o f Religion, 25, 215-232.

Gramzow, R., & Tangney, J. P. (1992). Proneness to shame
and the narcissistic personality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 369-376.

Watson, P. J., Morris, R. J., & Hood, R. W., Jr. (1988). Sin and
self-functioning, part 1: Grace, guilt, and self-consciousness.
Journal of Psychology and Theology, 16, 254-269·

Lindenthal, J. J., Myers, J. Κ., Pepper, M., & Stern, M. S.
(1970). Mental status and religious behavior. Journalfo r the
Scientific Study of Religion, 9, 143-149·

Wicker, F. W., Payne, G. C., & Morgan, R. D. (1983). Partidpant descriptions of guilt and shame. Motivation and Emotion, 7, 25-38.

McMinn, M. R. (1984). Religious values and client-therapist
matching in psychotherapy. Journal o f Psychology and Theology, 12, 24-33·

AUTHORS

Mosher, D. L. (1966). The development and multitrait-multimethod matrix analysis of three measures of three aspects
of guilt. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30, 25-29.

MEEK, KATHERYN RHOADS, Address: Department of Psychology, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187. Degree: MA,
Wheaton College, Clinical Psychology. Currently enrolled
in the PsyD program at Wheaton College.

Mowrer, O. H., & Veszelovszky, A. V. (1980). There may
indeed be a “right way”: Response to James D. Smrtic. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1 7, 440-447.
Narramore, S. B. (1984). No condemnation. Grand Rapids,
MI: Zondervan.

ALBRIGHT, JEANNE S., Address: Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60126. Title:
Assistant Professor of Psychology. Degree: PhD, Northwestem University.

Pennebaker, J. W., Hughes, C. F., & O’Heeron, R. C. (1987).
The psychophysiology of confession: Linking inhibitory
and psychosomatic processes. Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 52, 781-793·

McMINN, MARK R., Address: Department of Psychology,
Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187. Title: Professor of
Psychology. Degree: PhD, Vanderbilt University. Specializations: Ethics, assessment, cognitive therapy.

